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I. INTRODUCTION
My paper for this symposium deals with the decline of honest and
open dialogue in American public discourse. My goal in this paper
is to offer some ideas of how we could possibly find "truth" in all the
rhetoric being thrown out there to find common ground, engender
honest conversation about national and global concerns, and dispel
fear of the "other." To begin honest and open dialogue among people
and constituencies with conflicting views, where fear and distrust
take center stage, propositions that correspond to verifiable facts
must be presented as propositions of truth, so that discussions of
national and international significance will take their natural
course without stalling because of fear and distrust. The political
crisis in America today is so profound because parties situated in
each side of a divided spectrum believe so sincerely in their point of
view and how that point of view represents most accurately the con-
stitutional democracy they, and those before them, fought so hard
to attain.
The dilemma we face in public discourse today can be portrayed
with a felicitous analogy. A wise shop owner in a small town once
taught his son that the most difficult problem with operating a cash
register, ringing up the purchases, taking the money from the cus-
tomer, and handing them the change was less about deceptive cus-
tomers who are dishonest about how much they handed the cashier.
105
Duquesne Law Review
The real problem and the more difficult to resolve is when the cus-
tomer honestly believed that they gave the cashier $20 while the
cashier honestly believed with equal sincerity that the customer
only handed them $10.1 This political crisis presents a similar co-
nundrum, where parties to the political divide sincerely believe that
they are fighting to uphold core American values that the other side
is trying to rob them of. This is a very difficult problem to work out
satisfactorily.
But with the store owner example, there is a single and actual
amount that was exchanged between customer and cashier. That
amount exists as the indisputable "truth" despite each party's sin-
cerely held belief of how much was exchanged. The real amount
that was exchanged could be either $10 or $20 (or perhaps even an-
other amount), and if the parties could identify that amount, the
matter might be resolved amicably. Identifying that amount to the
satisfaction of both parties may, however, be extremely difficult be-
cause both parties would have their own way of arriving at the right
amount that was exchanged. The customer could say how much she
had to begin with and how much she is left with after the exchange.
Or the cashier could count what was in his cash register before and
after the exchange. But neither one of these solutions to arrive at
the "truth" of the matter would satisfy the other party that what
was presented as true from one party's perspective is indeed in fact
true. In this situation, moreover, the cashier's "truth" might differ
considerably from the customer's without any irrefutable way to re-
solve the problem. Letting the parties present their own "truth of
the matter" would cause them to end up where they started. To
deal with the problem more effectively, we would have to look to
objective and unquestionable facts, such as eye witnesses or sur-
veillance videos, which would provide verifiable and indisputable
facts that would serve as truth to both the cashier and the customer.
Such factual evidence is irrefutable and when presented to the par-
ties, offers a decisive solution to the problem by demonstrating that
some sincerely held beliefs can sometimes be distorted by one's own
idiosyncratic perception of actual facts and may have to be set aside
to make way for an actual resolution.
In American public discourse, the pursuit and identification of
truth is crucial at a time when political polarization has led to ide-
ological silos and political gridlock. The Pew Research Center, for
1. I owe this narrative to Charles Lipson, who wrote a commentary on the American
political crisis for Real Clear Politics. See Charles Lipson, Why America's Political Crisis is




example, noted that 41% of Democrats see the Republican Party as
a threat to the nation's well-being and that 45% of Republicans view
the Democratic Party as posing a similar threat to the country.2
More than half of Democrats (55%) say that the Republican Party
makes them feel "afraid," while 49% of Republicans feel the same
fear about he Democratic Party. Among members of these parties
who are highly engaged with politics (i.e., partisans who vote regu-
larly and who either volunteer for or donate to their party's political
campaigns), "70% of Democrats and 62% of Republicans say they
are afraid of the other party."3 Healing these partisan divisions to
allow for honest dialogue depends crucially on finding a common
objective "truth" that might reveal how some sincerely held beliefs
about the "other" and their agenda, moral values, social and eco-
nomic life, and equality more generally may be distorted by per-
sonal biases and heuristics. For genuine discussion and compro-
mise to occur, fear of political outgroups must be addressed and id-
iosyncratic perceptions of the facts set aside.
Seeing the "other"4 as being a threat to the nation's well-being
and being afraid of the "other" is significant because fear goes be-
yond mere distrust or exasperation of the "other." Fear conjures up
trepidation, anxiety, and alarm. Fear leads to a shutdown of open
dialogue and tolerance of the other. From an evolutionary view
point, for our primate ancestors, fear kept them alive from preda-
tors-at least for as long as they could to reproduce and pass on
their genes.5 For our primate ancestors, fear served a purpose by
ensuring their survivability in a physically dangerous environment.
But fear in society today-when modern man is no longer pursued
as food by sabre tooth tigers, venomous snakes, large constrictors,
or animals of that sort-is debilitating. In political discourse in
modern society, fear of the "other" leads to polarization. As there
are no social norms or sanctions that discourage overt disapproval
2. Partisan and Political Animosity in 2016, PEW RESEARCH CTR. (June 22, 2016),
http://www.people-press.org/2016/06/22/partisanship-and-political-animosity-in-2016/.
3. Id.
4. In psychology, the "other" is considered to be the "wide and wild world" that lies be-
yond our individual selves and "[o]utside our own ego-driven borders," which is "too great,
too vast, unpredictable, and messy for us to feel safe." David M. Goodman & Mark Freeman,
Introduction: Why The Other?, in PSYCHOLOGY AND THE OTHER 1, 1 (David M. Goodman &
Mark Freeman eds., 2015). For the purposes of this paper, the "other" refers to individuals
and groups who are different from us in viewpoint, beliefs, and ideals.
5. GORDON H. ORIANS, SNAKES, SUNRISES, AND SHAKESPEARE: HOW EVOLUTION SHAPES
OUR LOVES AND FEARS 43 (2014).
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and discrimination of political opponents, partisans have a ten-
dency to openly discriminate against opposing partisans.6 Much of
this intolerance toward opposing political and ideological affiliation
is attributable to hostility and animosity directed at the "other" ra-
ther than favoritism turned inward toward their own political
party.7 This tendency for open discrimination is based on false bi-
ases and partisan affects geared toward co-partisans and against
political opponents,8 while each partisan's truth about policy posi-
tions, national expectations, and ideological ideals remain obscured
under these incorrect assumptions about the "other."9
Participants in public discourse must be aware of such biases and
heuristics because they cause cognitive errors and obscure the truth
about contemporary economic, social, and political issues, such that
honest and open dialogues cannot take place, and answers to hard
questions remain elusive in public spaces. This paper argues that
"truth" can only be discoverable when we, like the customer and
cashier in the shop owner example, are willing to set aside our sin-
cerely held beliefs for the pursuit of objective and verifiable facts.
Part II of this paper suggests that normative ethics can offer the
analytical lenses through which philosophical "truths"-such as the
fact that justice is an essential characteristic of any well-thriving
and robust society, as well as a "fundamental moral virtue that ex-
tends beyond the individual to regulate proper conduct within a po-
litical community"1 0-can be identified and verified or supported
through the natural sciences."1 Part III suggests that while actual
truth can be identified through normative ethics and verified
through the natural sciences, truth about human nature and the
essentials of certain virtues in a political economy is often obscured
6. Shanto Iyengar & Sean J. Westwood, Fear Loathing Across Party Lines: New Evi-
dence on Group Polarization, 59 AM. J. POL. SC. 690, 690 (2015) (stating that "[u]nlike race,
gender, and other social divides where group-related attitudes and behaviors are constrained
by social norms, there are no corresponding pressures to temper disapproval of political op-
ponents.. .. Partisans therefore feel free to express animus and engage in discriminatory
behavior toward opposing partisans") (internal citations omitted).
7. Id. at 691.
8. Id. at 704.
9. Id. at 704-05.
10. CLAIRE RICHTER SHERMAN, IMAGING ARISTOTLE: VERBAL AND VISUAL
REPRESENTATION IN FOURTEENTH-CENTURY FRANCE 93 (1995).
11. This is not to say that philosophical knowledge of basic human truths and moral
norms are to be deduced, inferred, or derived from the natural sciences or from facts about
human nature. See ROBERT P. GEORGE, IN DEFENSE OF NATURAL LAW 85 (1999). Factual
findings about human nature from the cognitive and neurosciences or biology, however, can
support what moral philosophers have identified as human "truths" without committing G.E.
Moore's naturalistic fallacy. See G.E. MOORE, PRINCIPIA ETHICA 38-39 (Dover Publications,
Inc., 2004) (1903) (arguing that just because we find something to have "good" qualities does
not necessarily make that thing good in itself).
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by cognitive errors, which prevent us from accessing and knowing
truth through our cognitive mechanisms. Part IV presents argu-
ments that legal institutions and government intervention are nec-
essary to correct these cognitive errors and establish common
ground where truth may exist to dispel fear and distrust of the other
and for fruitful dialogue to occur among opposing parties to public
discourses in civil society.
II. IDENTIFYING "TRUTH" THROUGH NORMATIVE ETHICS AND
FINDING SUPPORT THROUGH THE NATURAL SCIENCES
The "truth" of a matter, in a practical sense, can be thought to be
the epistemic justification for a known belief-possessing the fac-
tual knowledge that would prove an accepted proposition to be true
and justify its acceptance by its believer.12 Propositions that are
true can be divided into philosophical truths, which are identified
by accessing human knowledge of God or by accessing human rea-
son and distinguishing the practically reasonable from the practi-
cally unreasonable,13 and scientific or physical truths. For instance,
water is a product of two hydrogen molecules and a single oxygen
molecule, and the Statue of Liberty is in Liberty Island in New York
Harbor-facts which are identified through empirical work, tests,
and observations. For political and civil discourse in contemporary
public life to make headway without the distrust and fear that has
hindered the honest exchange of views and prevented opportunities
for collaboration, objective verifiable propositions that are true
must be presented to participants in this dialogue. Parties to the
dialogue should be able to explain or justify their values, principles,
or political positions by presenting evidence that supports their
point of view as true. In practice, that which is true to ourselves is
often a matter of theoretical and axiomatic principles that we adopt
and which we cannot detach from philosophy. As Harvard's politi-
cal philosopher Michael J. Sandel states in the preface to his book
Democracy's Discontent: America in Search of a Public Philosophy:
12. Earl Conee, The Truth Connection, 52 PHIL. & PHENOMENOLOGICAL RES. 657, 657
(1992).
13. JOHN D. CAPUTO, TRUTH: PHILOSOPHY IN TRANSIT: THE SEARCH FOR WISDOM IN A
POSTMODERN AGE 19-20 (2013). See also THOMAS AQUINAS, ST. THOMAS AQUINAS ON
POLITICS AND ETHICS 5 (Paul E. Sigmund ed. & trans., 1988) (stating that the "objects of the
senses on which human reason bases its knowledge retain some traces of likeness to God,
since they exist and are good"); JOHN FINNIS, NATURAL LAW AND NATURAL RIGHTS 18 (1980)
(describing natural lawyers' use of principles of practical rightmindedness to identify "good
and proper order among men and in individual conduct").
Summer 2018 109
Duquesne Law Review
But if political philosophy is unrealizable in one sense, it is un-
avoidable in another. This is the sense in which philosophy in-
hibits the world from the start; our practices and institutions
are embodiments of theory. We could hardly describe our polit-
ical life, much less engage in it without recourse to a language
laden with theory - of rights and obligations, citizenship and
freedom, democracy and law. Political institutions are not
simply instruments that implement ideas independently con-
ceived; they are themselves embodiment of ideas. For all we
may resist such ultimate questions as the meaning of justice
and the nature of the good life, what we cannot escape is that
we live some answer to these questions - we live some theory
- all the time.1 4
Thus, because of the philosophical underpinnings of political life
and civic engagement, one good way to begin to identify common
objective "truths" for civil political discourse is to engage in philo-
sophical inquiries about what is morally true and right. Moral
questions that deal with standards of right and wrong, good and
bad habits, and individual rights and duties central to normative
ethics could provide analytical tools to help us determine whether
particular beliefs and ideas are morally right and how an individ-
ual's sincerely held beliefs measure against these moral "truths."
The analytical approach to identifying moral truths engages what
moral philosophers call "prescriptive" or "normative" questions15 to
find answers as to what may be morally correct or "true" against an
objective standard and in an absolute way while acknowledging
that what may be morally right or wrong may be socially, histori-
cally, and culturally contingent.16 These philosophical questions re-
quire us to engage with what might be the truth of a given situation
regardless of the moral beliefs that an individual or community may
have normalized. In most cases, these "truths" are considered self-
evident truths in that they present various values, virtues, and
14. MICHAEL J. SANDEL, DEMOCRACY'S DISCONTENT: AMERICA IN SEARCH OF A PUBLIC
PHILOSOPHY, at ix (1998).
15. In this paper, I draw a distinction between normative and prescriptive analyses, even
though "normative" and "prescriptive" are sometimes used interchangeably. Normative
analysis proposes standards of what ought to be without necessarily referencing empirical
facts (e.g., murder should be illegal because there is value to human life), whereas prescrip-
tive analysis draws from empirical facts about what one should do in a particular situation
(e.g., one needs to do x, y, and z to achieve a particular result because that is standard pro-
tocol).
16. JOHN W. COOK, MORALITY AND CULTURAL DIFFERENCES 8 (1999) (explaining that an-




goods which are inherently good, such as knowledge, and which
should be pursued-not as an instrument to an end, but as an end
in itself.17
So, for example, one of the questions about moral truths that
moral philosophy and normative ethics might help answer in Amer-
ica today is the question about immigration and whether allowing
foreign citizens into the country would strengthen the country's
economy and help the country grow. Whether a country like the
United States should allow or restrict the inflow of immigrants
might depend on identifying hard and difficult moral truths about
the individual's rights and a society's collective right to flourish and
grow and figuring out where the issue of immigration fits in this
analysis. Moral philosophy and normative ethics might contribute
to this analysis by offering rational arguments that might inform
us of how a fully flourishing society should be or ought to be,
whether there are certain inviolable moral laws to respect the dig-
nity and well-being of fellow human beings, or if the decision to al-
low immigrants into the country will have beneficial consequences
or outcomes that outweigh any potential costs. Thus, by asserting
that a fully flourishing society depends on having diverse talents of
individuals living in that society, a philosopher could make a nor-
mative proposition that immigration is a good thing that should be
encouraged because the inflow of talent from other countries con-
tributes to the betterment of that society and outweighs the cost of
increased immigrants into the country.18 Moral philosophy's quest
for normativity is an excellent way to dispel claims that moral val-
ues and the ideals of justice and equity are subjective beliefs and
therefore incapable of exhibiting any level of truth if objective
standards for truth, such as the self-evident truth that all men are
created equal and endowed with certain inalienable rights,19 can be
identified and accepted as a basis for political discourse.
Normative analyses, however, depend on lines of philosophical
argumentation to support moral claims as truths. These philosoph-
ical argumentations are not normally empirically supported. A nor-
mative analysis may propose a hypothesis or assume an axiom for
rational engagement but does not necessarily refer to empirical
facts in its identification of "truth" because of the philosopher's be-
17. David F. Forte, The Natural Law Moment, in NATURAL LAW AND CONTEMPORARY
PUBLIC POLICY 6 (David F. Forte ed., 1998).
18. See Thomas B. Edsall, What Does Immigration Actually Cost Us?, N.Y. TIMES (Sept.
29, 2016), https://nyti.ms/2dmt3wt.
19. THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 2 (U.S. 1776).
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lief that moral norms, ends, are truths not reducible to nor vindi-
cated by descriptive or empirical facts.20 Ethics and morality, how-
ever, are concerned with "saying what contributes to the well-being
of humans, human groups, and human individuals in particular
natural and social environments"21 and have linkages to how we as
human beings think and behave in these environments. But natu-
ralized moral inquiries cannot and should not be confined to only
the study of human ecology.22 Because of advances in the study of
the human brain and mind in relation to moral judgment and be-
havior, cognitive science has shown that moral judgments and de-
cisions are deeply affected by our cognitive functions.23 For exam-
ple, psychopathy and antisocial personality disorder (APD) are
mental and personality disorders that manifest as a lack of empa-
thy or kindness toward situations that would normally cause a per-
son to feel distress (e.g., when looking at a picture of a crying child).
The person with psychopathy and APD is often perceived to be an
unkind or, even worse, an immoral person who has no compassion
for human suffering. Such disorders are believed to arise because
of a biological dysfunction of the amygdala and ventromedial pre-
frontal cortex (VMPFC) in the brain, which causes abnormal re-
sponses to morally salient stimuli.2 4 Studies of various neural
structures in neuroscience suggests that it would one day be possi-
ble to understand how the human brain makes moral decisions as
it encodes and manipulates the content of thoughts,25 and a natu-
ralized study of morality and ethics should then be a study of indi-
vidual human biology, neurology, and psychology as much as it is a
study of human ecology.
The identification of truth through normative ethics and moral
philosophy for the purposes of public discourse should be supported
with empirical findings in the natural and biological sciences to val-
idate propositions presented as true. In the shopkeeper's example,
20. Owen Flanagan, Hagop Sarkissian & David Wong, What is the Nature of Morality?
A Response to Casebeer, Railton, and Ruse, in 1 MORAL PSYCHOLOGY: THE EVOLUTION OF
MORALITY: ADAPTATIONS AND INNATENESS 45, 45 (Walter Sinnott-Armstrong ed., 2008).
21. Owen Flanagan, Hagop Sarkissian & David Wong, Naturalizing Ethics, in 1 MORAL
PSYCHOLOGY: THE EVOLUTION OF MORALITY: ADAPTATIONS AND INNATENESS 1, 18 (Walter
Sinnott-Armstrong ed., 2008).
22. Id. (stating that "[i]f ethics is like any science or is part of any science, it is part of
human ecology, concerned with saying what contributes to the well-being of humans, human
groups, and human individuals in particular natural and social environments").
23. Joshua D. Greene, The Cognitive Neuroscience ofMoral Judgment and Decision Mak-
ing, in THE COGNITIVE NEUROSCIENCES 1013, 1013 (Michael S. Gazzaniga & George R.
Mangun eds., 5th ed. 2014).
24. Id. at 1014-15.
25. Id. at 1019.
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objectively verifiable and unquestionable facts, such as eye wit-
nesses and surveillance videos, provide provable and indisputable
facts about the actual cash exchange to serve as indisputable
"truth" to disagreeing parties who believe so sincerely in their point
of view that the possibility of error on their part becomes marginal.
More and more philosophers and ethicists are drawing lessons from
cognitive psychology, brain science, and evolutionary biology to ad-
dress philosophical questions today despite opposition from more
traditional philosophers;26 if empirical science can support (or dis-
credit) moral claims about what is normatively right or wrong, we
would be able to, in a practical sense, discern whether a point of
view advanced by a participant in the discourse is acceptable as a
premise for engagement in civic discourse. Some sincerely held
moral beliefs that contribute to today's political crisis, for example,
may be a result of complex evolutionary processes taking place over
a long period of time and that has nothing to do with whether that
particular act is morally right or wrong. The moral norm against
having sexual relations with members of one's own family may stem
from an evolutionary need to have offspring that are strong and
healthy and is not necessarily a normative standard that should be
used to help us determine the moral value of a particular conduct
or point of view.2 7 Empirical evidence from these studies in evolu-
tionary biology dilute moral assertions-even if they were sincerely
held for a long time-about the wrongness of particularly non-so-
cially conforming ideas or beliefs. When sincerely-held viewpoints
are discredited by empirical science, they need be set aside to make
way for more accurate beliefs that are consistent with factual
knowledge if civil public discourse is to advance.
Other studies suggest that some moral qualities may be common
to humanity. Empirical findings produced by these studies, such as
studies in neuroscience that show that a child's moral development
follows a "universal sequence of stages" and is not idiosyncratic to
the particular child,2 8 suggest that moral sensibility in human be-
ings is universal. Two-year-old children who are put in a room and
26. Walter Sinnott-Armstrong, Introduction, in 1 MORAL PSYCHOLOGY: THE EVOLUTION
OF MORALITY: ADAPTATIONS AND INNATENESS xiii, xiii-xiv (Walter Sinnott-Armstrong ed.,
2008).
27. For example, the moral stance against incest has less to do with propriety than with
the biological need to produce children without congenital, physical, and intellectual malfor-
mation. See Debra Lieberman, Moral Sentiments Relating to Incest: Discerning Adaptation
from By-Products, in 1 MORAL PSYCHOLOGY: THE EVOLUTION OF MORALITY: ADAPTATIONS
AND INNATENESS 165, 165-69 (Walter Sinnott-Armstrong ed., 2008).
28. Jerome Kagan, Morality and Its Development, in 3 MORAL PSYCHOLOGY: THE
NEUROSCIENCE OF MORALITY: EMOTION, BRAIN DISORDERS, AND DEVELOPMENT 297, 299-303
(Walter Sinnott-Armstrong ed., 2008).
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presented with objects that have had their integrity flawed (e.g., a
shirt with a button missing or a toy truck without its wheels) in-
stinctively know that there is something wrong about the object
when they respond by saying "yukky" or "boo-boo" upon seeing the
object. Irrespective of culture, children know that a flawed object
that he or she did not break has had its integrity violated by another
person or force.29 Knowledge of our inherently moral self can sup-
port the assertion that respecting the integrity of other people and
things in our surroundings is a moral expectation that must be hon-
ored. When participants to political discourse disagree about rights
to fossil fuel consumption and its greenhouse effects, a moral prop-
osition that we respect our environment and prevent its destruction
can be supported by a study that proves the ubiquity of moral sen-
sibilities toward our surroundings as more consistent with
"truth"-rather than the moral proposition that there should be an
absolute right to economic growth and industrial development. In
this sense, studies in neuroscience offer practical ways in which
"truth" may be empirically tested to give one moral proposition
greater weight over a less "true" moral proposition.
The study of babies and how morality is revealed in their inter-
action with their surroundings provides some evidence that moral
foundations in human beings are not learned from social contexts,
but are, rather, inherent o human nature. At the Yale Infant Cog-
nition Center,30 psychologist Karen Wynn has conducted baby stud-
ies showing that babies as young as three months old-an age be-
fore their parents or caretakers can influence them as to what is
normatively "good" and "bad," fair, and just-have an innate sense
of morality that is not instilled but is "instead [a] product[ ] of bio-
logical evolution."31 In one experiment conducted at the center, a
one-year-old boy is shown a puppet show in which one puppet
played with a ball while interacting with two other puppets. The
middle puppet would roll the ball to the puppet on the right, who
would pass it back. This was the "nice" puppet. Then, the center
puppet would roll the ball to the puppet on the left, who would run
away with it. This was the "naughty" puppet. The two puppets on
the ends were then brought down from the stage and set before the
toddler. Each was placed next to a pile of treats. At this point, the
toddler was asked to take a treat away from one puppet. Like most
children in this situation, the boy took it from the pile of the
"naughty" one. But this punishment wasn't enough: The baby then
29. Id. at 299.
30. PAUL BLOOM, JUST BABIES: THE ORIGINS OF GOOD AND EVIL 24-25 (2013).
31. Id. at 8, 28-29.
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leaned over and smacked the "naughty" puppet in the head.32 Paul
Bloom in his interview with CNN had this observation to offer: "Hu-
mans are born with a hard-wired morality, a sense of good and evil
is bred in the bone."33 But he also goes on to caution: "We are nat-
urally moral beings, but our environments can enhance-or, sadly,
degrade-this innate moral sense."34
Empirical findings that human beings are hardwired with an in-
nate sense of right and wrong on a fundamental level is evidence
that can be used to adduce propositional truths to guide political
discourse in America. This foundational moral sense of right and
wrong that we see in babies is reminiscent of classical natural law
theory that man's desires and emotions must be "governed and
moderated by the standards of reason" and good order because that
is proper by the law of nature.35 The one-year-old baby's sense of
right and wrong when one puppet does a good deed and the other a
bad deed serves as the cornerstone for a more matured and nuanced
sense of justice, a concept that must be central to the idea of "truth"
in public discourse-where many contentious issues revolve around
what the most "just" outcome would be in a difficult social or eco-
nomic problem. In political life, natural law theories have a central
role in advancing thinking about the role and limits of government
and the proper purpose of law and legal institutions.36
Theoretically, these foundational moral truths about how we
should behave, the types of things or goods we should pursue, the
ideals we should hold, and what belonging to a good society looks
like, which can be empirically demonstrated through the natural
sciences, would be accessible through practical reason37 as self-evi-
dent-truths-truths that require no justification for their ac-
ceptance because they are, by nature, true.38 In theory, we should
be able to know what these "truths" are to guide civil discourse in
American public life. However, these "truths" are not always acces-
sible to us through practical reason. The human mind is sometimes
32. Id. at 7.
33. Paul Bloom, Do Babies Know Right from Wrong?, CNN,
http://www.cnn.com/2014/02/12/opinion/bloom-babies-right-wrong/index.html (last updated
Feb. 14, 2014, 12:02 PM ET).
34. Id.
35. John Finnis, Classical Natural Law Theory, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF
JURISPRUDENCE AND PHILOSOPHY OF LAW 3 (Jules Coleman & Scott Shapiro eds., 2002).
36. Brian H. Bix, Natural Law: The Modern Tradition, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF
JURISPRUDENCE AND PHILOSOPHY OF LAW 61 (Jules Coleman & Scott Shapiro eds., 2002).
37. FINNIS, supra note 13, at 18 ("A sound theory of natural law is one that explicitly ...
undertakes a critique of practical viewpoints, in order to distinguish the practically unrea-
sonable from the practically reasonable[.]").
38. Id. at 32.
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prone to cognitive errors that are a result of heuristics, which are
principles that help "reduce the complex tasks of assessing proba-
bilities and predicting values to simpler judgmental operations,"39
and biases, "departures from the normative rational theory that
served as markers or signatures of the underlying heuristics."40 In
reality, heuristics and biases work to direct cognitive processes to-
ward erroneous outcomes in human decision-making and prevent
us from identifying moral truths to guide civil discourse toward so-
cially, economically, and politically reasonable conclusions.
III. COGNITIVE ERRORS PREVENT US FROM KNOWING TRUTH
To appreciate the effect of heuristics and biases on cognitive pro-
cesses, consider this scenario of the "hedonic twins."41 The twins,
Albert and Ben, have identical tastes and currently hold identical
starting jobs, with little income and little leisure time. The firm in
which they work offers them two improved positions-positions A
and B-and lets the twins choose whether they would prefer a raise
of $10,000 (position A) or an extra day of paid vacation each month
(position B). Since Albert and Ben are indifferent about their op-
tions from their current position (their reference point), they toss a
coin, and Albert gets the $10,000 raise while Ben gets the extra lei-
sure time. After some time passes, both Albert and Ben get accus-
tomed and used to their new positions. The firm now suggests that
they both switch positions. Expected utility theory, which predicts
that a person, when presented with a choice between two outcomes,
will choose the outcome with the highest expected utility, 42 assumes
that the twins will need little or no incentives to switch because
both options are equally attractive to both of them. After all, both
twins have identical tastes and did not have any preference when
the firm initially presented them with positions A and B.
39. Amos Tversky & Daniel Kahneman, Judgment Under Uncertainty: Heuristics and
Biases, in JUDGMENT UNDER UNCERTAINTY: HEURISTICS AND BIASES 3 (Daniel Kahneman,
Paul Slovic & Amos Tversky eds., 2008).
40. Thomas Gilovich & Dale Griffin, Introduction - Heuristics and Biases: Then and
Now, in HEURISTICS AND BIASES: THE PSYCHOLOGY OF INTUITIVE JUDGMENT 3 (Thomas Gi-
lovich, Dale W. Griffin & Daniel Kahneman eds., 2013).
41. DANIEL KAHNEMAN, THINKING, FAST AND SLOW 291 (2011).
42. Rachael Briggs, Normative Theories ofRational Choice: Expected Utility, STANFORD:
PLATO (Aug. 8, 2014), https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2017/entries/rationality-norma-
tive-utility (last modified Feb. 7, 2017).
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However, prospect theory, developed by psychologists Daniel
Kahneman and Amos Tversky,4 3 assumes that both twins will pre-
fer to remain where they currently are because of a preference for
the status quo (known as the "status quo bias") and an aversion
against loss ("loss aversion").4 4 From Albert's first reference point
when he was given a choice between positions A and B, he would
have found both alternatives-a raise of $10,000 or twelve extra
days of paid vacation-equally attractive because he had neither
high income nor high leisure time. After choosing a raise of $10,000
and being in position A for a while, Albert's reference point would
have changed,4 5 and his choice would have a new structure: Stay at
position A (there is no gain and no loss), or move to position B (re-
ceive twelve extra days of paid vacation but also take a $10,000 sal-
ary cut). In this new situation, it is unlikely that Albert will choose
to move to position B because a salary cut of $10,000 represents a
loss, and there is a general aversion to loss. The same reasoning
applies to Ben because giving up twelve days of paid vacation rep-
resents a greater loss than the gain of $10,000 in extra income. The
hedonic twins example demonstrates that preferences do not re-
main the same, changing with the reference point as it changes; the
costs of a change often outweighs its benefit, as "changes that make
things worse (losses) loom larger than improvements or gains,"46
thereby "inducing a bias that favors the status quo."4 7
Status quo bias and loss aversion represent anomalies to the eco-
nomic belief that human behavior can be best explained by "assum-
ing that [economic] agents have stable, well-defined preferences
and [that they] make rational choices consistent with those prefer-
ences in markets that (eventually) clear."4 8 The anomalies that peo-
ple tend to prefer the status quo when change involves incurring
losses, identified by Kahneman and Tversky as being essential fea-
tures of the prospect theory, commensurate with and provide sup-
port for the endowment effect (the idea that "losses from a reference
position are systematically valued far more than commensurate
gains" and that "[t]he minimum compensation people demand to
43. See generally Daniel Kahneman & Amos Tversky, Prospect Theory: An Analysis of
Decision Under Risk, 47 ECONOMETRICA 263 (1979).
44. KAHNEMAN, supra note 41, at 291.
45. Prospect theory assumes that preferences do not remain stable, unlike expected util-
ity theory, which assumes that preferences are stable over time. Id.
46. Daniel Kahneman, Jack L. Knetsch & Richard H. Thaler, Anomalies: The Endow-
ment Effect, Loss Aversion, and Status Quo Bias, in CHOICES, VALUES, AND FRAMES 165 (Dan-
iel Kahneman & Amos Tversky eds., 2000).
47. KAHNEMAN, supra note 41, at 292.
48. Kahneman, Knetsch & Thaler, supra note 46, at 159.
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give up a good has been found to be several times larger than the
maximum amount they are willing to pay for a commensurate enti-
tlement"49). The endowment effect, a term coined by Chicago econ-
omist Richard Thaler and used to refer to the observation that peo-
ple would demand much more to give up an object or entitlement
than they would be willing to pay to acquire the same object or en-
titlement, cause people to hold on to objects, rights, or entitlements
because of the pain of giving it up (loss aversion). Whereas one who
does not have the object, right, or entitlement to begin with is not
willing to spend as much to acquire the object, right, or entitlement
because the disadvantage of parting with the money (or any other
measurement of value) to acquire the object, right, or entitlement
outweighs any benefit of acquiring them (the status quo bias). The
endowment effect plays out in reality because of our cognitive pro-
cesses and has got nothing to do with the inherent value of the ob-
ject, right, or entitlement per se.50
Because of how the mind processes information when it is faced
with situations that require quick decision-making, the mind uses
heuristics to make quick and intuitive judgments that are at times
erroneous because of the presence of cognitive biases. Psychologists
call the mind's method of making quick automatic decisions with
minimal information and external input "System 1," which is con-
trasted with "System 2," the more deliberate, careful, and slower
mental activity that is "often associated with the subjective experi-
ence of agency, choice, and concentration."5 1 System 1's intuitive
judgment and quick decision-making process would explain the en-
dowment effect, loss aversion, and status quo bias that Kahneman,
Tversky, and Thaler considered anomalies to standard economic be-
havior. Why else would a wine collector who bought wine at auc-
tions for a maximum amount of $35 be only willing to sell that same
bottle of wine for no less than $100, neither buying nor selling the
bottle at prices between $35 and $100? The minimum selling price
of $100 was significantly higher than the buying price of $35, which
is inconsistent with standard economic theory, which assumes that
the wine collector would have a single value for the bottle (e.g., $50)
and would sell if he receives an offer above the value (more than
$50) and be willing to pay up to $50 for the same bottle of wine. 52
49. Jack L. Knetsch, The Endowment Effect and Evidence of Nonreversible Indifference
Curves, in CHOICES, VALUES, AND FRAMES 171 (Daniel Kahneman & Amos Tversky eds.,
2000).
50. Kahneman, Knetsch & Thaler, supra note 46, at 163 ("[T]he main effect of endow-
ment is not to enhance the appeal of the good one owns, only the pain of giving it up.").
51. KAHNEMAN, supra note 41, at 20-22.
52. Id. at 292-93.
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Other studies have shown the same discrepancy between the mini-
mum selling price and maximum buying price.53
Heuristics and cognitive biases do not only explain anomalies in
economic behavior. They also explain how moral truths about the
right course of action in political life could remain inaccessible to
the human mind. The value of moral truths only becomes evident
after a person, having "experienced the urge to question, [ ] has
grasped the connection between question and answer" and realizes
that knowledge is a product of "correct answers to particular ques-
tions."54 Identifying moral truths for the purposes of political dis-
course means asking the right questions and getting to the right
answers. This process can be interrupted by heuristics and cogni-
tive biases that prevent us from arriving at true knowledge about
an issue. Take, for example, the political issue of whether to place
limits on the amount of carbon that polluters are allowed to emit to
address global climate change. Suppose the federal government
proposes to restrict carbon emission by introducing "carbon pric-
ing," a market-based strategy for lowering global warming emis-
sions by putting a price (an actual monetary value) on carbon emis-
sions so that the costs of climate impacts and the opportunities for
low-carbon energy options are better reflected in our production and
consumption choices.
The question can be presented in two ways depending on what
people believed was the status quo. If people were convinced that
climate change was not the status quo, they can be asked for the
minimum amount of money they would be willing to accept (WTA)
to agree to carbon emission and the possibility of irreversible global
warming. One way is to ask how much of a discount consumers
would be willing to accept in the price of goods or services produced
by companies for every one ton of carbon dioxide that the company
releases into the atmosphere. On the other hand, if people were
convinced that climate change was already part of the status quo,
they can be asked what they would be willing to pay (WTP) to re-
duce or eliminate the effects of global climate change through a car-
bon tax imposed on companies, the cost of which would be trans-
ferred to consumers in the price of goods or services. Based on pre-
vious studies conducted,55 the discrepancy between the WTA and
WTP responses would be significant with the WTA responses
greatly exceeding the WTP. The more extreme WTA responses can
53. See Kahneman, Knetsch & Thaler, supra note 46, at 160-70.
54. FINNIS, supra note 13, at 63.
55. Kahneman, Knetsch & Thaler, supra note 46, at 167-68.
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be explained by protests to the acceptance of a new risk,5 6 but it is
less comprehensible why people would pay less to reduce or elimi-
nate the effects of climate change that is already felt (save for the
endowment effect and the general reluctance to spend money to ac-
quire something that they do not yet own). This discrepancy is
likely to manifest despite the fact that protecting the environment
and creating a sustainable and livable planet for ourselves would
be a moral imperative for human flourishing. This moral truth
might not be not accessible because the interplay of heuristics and
biases in our cognitive processes, such as the status quo bias, loss
aversion, and endowment effect, produce anomalies in ordinarily
reasonable thinking about morality and truth.
IV. THE ROLE OF LAW AND LEGAL INSTITUTIONS IN
IDENTIFYING TRUTH
The law has a unique and important role to play in contemporary
political life in America when partisan divides and distrust are per-
petuated by the lack of accessibility to the truth because of our cog-
nitive processes. The way we frame and present the issue has sig-
nificant impact on the outcome of a discourse. For example, fram-
ing a price as a "discount" or a "surcharge" will evoke markedly dif-
ferent responses from people because of the aversion to losses.
Tversky and Kahneman explain that "[i]t is easier to forgo a dis-
count than to accept a surcharge because the same price difference
is valued as a gain in the former case and a loss in the latter."5 7
Hence, to appease consumers, credit card companies "insist that
any price difference between cash and credit purchases should be
labeled as a cash discount rather than a credit surcharge."5 8 Fram-
ing and presenting an issue for political discourse in a way that is
constructive (rather than destructive) is important for American
public life, and careful thought must be made so that the speech or
language used to frame and present the issue highlights, rather
than obscures, the truth.
The late Emory law professor Harold Berman emphasizes the
value of language and its capacity to build and destroy communities
when he stated in his book Law and Language: Effective Symbols
of Community:
56. Id. at 168.
57. Amos Tversky & Daniel Kahneman, Rational Choice and the Framing ofDecisions,




Language can, indeed, be a most dangerous - the most danger-
ous - weapon. It can be used to enslave an individual or, in-
deed, a whole nation. It can be used to whip men into fury
against each other. It can be used to break a person down. Yet
these destructive uses of language are only possible because of
its constructive power - that is, the power of men through
speech to reach out to each other, to share each other's experi-
ence, to achieve some sort of meeting of minds and hearts, some
sort of agreement. These constructive uses of language are the
basis upon which its power to confuse and divide is built.59
Law is a type of language that goes beyond mere legal rules. Law
adds "rhetorical, ethical, and political meanings to what appears as
a merely 'logical,' that is, declarative, statement"60 and must be
morally congruent.61 When there is evidence that heuristics and
biases affect our cognitive processes to prevent us from knowing the
truth of an issue, which is theoretically accessible to us through
practical reason, laws and legal institutions need to address these
cognitive errors to ensure that policy decisions that emerge from
political and civil discourse are a result of deliberate, calculated,
and careful discussions that are not affected by the quick, intuitive,
and often anomalous judgments of the mind's system. The idea of
the law and legal institutions stepping in to correct deviations from
accepted norms and standards is not novel. In fact, government
and legal institutions have corrected market failures to align im-
perfect markets, where transfers of rights and entitlements cannot
occur due to the presence of externalities, monopolistic practices, or
transaction costs, to the economist's ideal of the perfect market.62
The doctrine of fair use in copyright law, for example, has been seen
as the law's way to permit uncompensated uses of copyrighted
works that cannot be effectuated through the market because of the
public good nature of copyrighted works, excessive costs of negoti-
ating the right to use, and the impracticality of enforcing rights
59. HAROLD J. BERMAN, LAW AND LANGUAGE: EFFECTIVE SYMBOLS OF COMMUNITY 43
(John Witte, Jr. ed., 2013).
60. Id. at 72.
61. Jules L. Coleman, The Architecture of Jurisprudence, 121 YALE L.J. 2, 55 (2011)
(Coleman states that the view that morality and law are connected applies to both natural
law and exclusive legal positivism: "The exclusive positivist is committed to the view that the
relationship is instrumental: law necessarily serves morality. The natural lawyer holds that
the relationship is at least in part intrinsic; morality is intrinsic to the nature of law.").
62. In a perfect market, rights and entitlements will transfer to parties who value the
right and entitlement the most regardless of how that right or entitlement is allocated, as-
suming that there are no transaction costs. R.H. Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, J.L. &
ECON. 1, 19 (1960) (recognizing that "courts directly influence economic activity").
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against non-purchasers. Fair use is the law's way of facilitating
transfers of the ability to use copyrighted works where "the possi-
bility of consensual bargain has broken down in some way."63 The
use of liability rules where the transfer of an initial entitlement to
a party who is willing to pay more for it than what it is worth to the
owner is another example of the law stepping in to correct market
failures.64
If the law and legal institutions work to facilitate economically
efficient transfers when markets fail to effectuate them because of
transaction costs, hold outs, or externalities by assuming the value
of the right to the right holder and forcing the transfer of rights as
if a hypothetical fair arms-length negotiation occurred on the mar-
ket,65 the law and legal institutions can work in the same way to
effectuate civil discourses about morally right courses of action
through deliberate and careful identification of truths to guide dia-
logue toward just and fair outcomes regardless of how hard the
questions are and how difficult the answers may be. To ask the
hard questions and arrive at difficult answers through open and
honest dialogue where participants are not fearful and distrusting
of the other, heuristics and biases that affect discourse and policy
outcomes must be abandoned for the truth of an issue. Participants
must acknowledge that living in a healthy and sustainable planet
is of utmost importance before they can even discuss whether car-
bon pricing-and what they would actually be willing to pay if car-
bon pricing was implemented as a policy-is a viable solution to
global climate change.
One way to remove these biases, heuristics, and other cognitive
errors to allow open and honest dialogue to take place is to get all
participants to the dialogue to agree as a community that they will
set aside personal interests and be guided by principles of justice
and fairness toward the good of their community or country. Of
course, individuals will have their own ideas as to what would con-
stitute justice, fairness, and the "best" moral outcome to the delib-
erations. And it would also be unrealistic to expect participants to
not be influenced by their status quo (the status quo bias) when
they deliberate policies that address distributional goals, the econ-
omy, and redistribution of rights and entitlements. To this end, it
63. Wendy J. Gordon, Fair Use as Market Failure: A Structural and Economic Analysis
of the Betamax Case and its Predecessors, 82 COLUM. L. REV. 1600, 1615 (1982).
64. Guido Calabresi & A. Douglas Melamed, Property Rules, Liability Rules, and Inal-
ienability: One View of the Cathedral, 85 HARV. L. REV. 1089, 1106-07 (1990).
65. Id. at 1108 ("In practice, it is so hard to determine [the property owner's] true valua-
tion that eminent domain simply gives him what the land is worth 'objectively,' in the full
knowledge that this may result in over or under compensation.").
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would be useful to deliberate from a hypothetical position that as-
sumes everyone to be ignorant of their status in life so that they will
not be influenced by their status quo.
John Rawls's idea of justice central to his book, A Theory of Jus-
tice, is instructional here in my proposal of how "truth" may be at-
tained for open and honest dialogue. Rawls's proposal that to attain
justice for society is for parties to the political debate to think and
discuss issues from an "original position," where "no one knows his
place in society, his class position or social status, nor does anyone
know his fortune in the distribution of natural assets and abilities,
his intelligence, strength, and the like" or even "their conceptions
of the good or their special psychological propensities."66 Beginning
civil and political discourse from this original position forces partic-
ipants to shed their biases, heuristics, and beliefs to come to the
table without predisposed ideas and expectations, allowing for a
more open, honest, and truthful dialogue that is constructive. With-
out the knowledge of one's position in life, one would not be influ-
enced by the status quo, be averse to losses, or be influenced by an
endowment effect. The truth of an issue, which theoretically is ac-
cessible through practical reason, would actually be more accessible
from the original position than it would be by sheer will.
V. CONCLUSION
Identifying truth in American public discourse is essential for
open and honest dialogue to take place, and it has not been easily
accessible because of our innate fear and distrust of the "other" and
because of our cognitive biases and psychological make-up. Politi-
cal dialogue and civil discourse must occur in situations where
these biases are abandoned for more deliberate and careful deliber-
ations. Where these deliberations fail because of cognitive errors,
the law and legal institutions have to facilitate policy outcomes as
if these dialogues occurred in circumstances that were open, honest,
and truthful. A decision to abandon carbon pricing, for example,
could be due to the fact that consumers were not willing to pay the
full price for reducing carbon emissions in the environment despite
the harm that such emissions would cause. A court of law in a nui-
sance case could impose a permanent injunction against a company
to prevent the release of carbon dioxide into the atmosphere, but
that would require the company to install appliances to prevent
66. JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 12 (1st ed. 1971).
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emissions and invest in renewable energy. The cost of these im-
provements would be transferred to the price of the goods and ser-
vices, which the consumer ultimately pays for. Here, the court
would have made the decision that consumers would have made but
for the endowment effect that affects human decisions. The path of
identifying truth for honest and open political dialogue is not going
to be easy, but it is worthwhile to stay on the path. Ultimately, fair,
just, and reasonable political, social, and economic decisions depend
on all parties to American public discourse accessing "truth" to
guide their deliberations and discussions.
